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Abstract
We provide a method of translating theories of Nute’s defeasible logic into logic programs,
and a corresponding translation in the opposite direction. Under certain natural restric-
tions, the conclusions of defeasible theories under the ambiguity propagating defeasible
logic ADL correspond to those of the well-founded semantics for normal logic programs,
and so it turns out that the two formalisms are closely related. Using the same transla-
tion of logic programs into defeasible theories, the semantics for the ambiguity blocking
defeasible logic NDL can be seen as indirectly providing an ambiguity blocking semantics
for logic programs.
We also provide antimonotone operators for both ADL and NDL, each based on the
Gelfond-Lifschitz (GL) operator for logic programs. For defeasible theories without de-
featers or priorities on rules, the operator for ADL corresponds to the GL operator and
so can be seen as partially capturing the consequences according to ADL. Similarly, the
operator for NDL captures the consequences according to NDL, though in this case no
restrictions on theories apply. Both operators can be used to define stable model semantics
for defeasible theories.
KEYWORDS: defeasible logic, logic programming, well-founded semantics, stable model
semantics, ambiguity blocking and propagation.
1 Introduction
Defeasible logic is a family of rule-based nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms orig-
inally developed by Donald Nute (Nute 1986; 1994; 1997; Nute et al. 1989). Over
the years, many variants have been proposed, with the most recent system created
by Nute himself—an ambiguity blocking logic which we call NDL—appearing in
the late 90s (Nute 1999; 2003; Donnelly 1999). An ambiguity propagating counter-
part to NDL, called ADL, was developed considerably later (Maier and Nute 2006).
Working separately, David Billington (1993) presented a quantified version of one
∗ To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
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of Nute’s logics and showed it to be cumulative. Billington, together with Grigoris
Antoniou, Michael Maher, Guido Governatori, and others, would later go on to
publish a number of papers on this logic and its offshoots (Antoniou et al. 2000a;
2000b; 2001; 2006; Governatori et al. 2004; Maher and Governatori 1999; Maher
et al. 2001). This logic—which we call BDL—and its variants are the ones most
frequently encountered in the literature.
Defeasible logic possesses several virtues which warrant its study. It is of low
computational complexity compared to, say, default logic (Reiter 1980) or logic
programming under the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988). E.g.,
some of the logics based on BDL have linear complexity (Maher et al. 2001). Also,
the different variants of defeasible logic express a variety of different intuitions, and
so, as Antoniou et al. (2000a) have said, defeasible logic forms a “flexible framework”
for knowledge representation. Furthermore, the device primarily responsible for
making defeasible logic defeasible—namely, the defeasible rule—is intuitively easy
to grasp, arguably easier than the default negation ∼ used in logic programming.
E.g., we at least find the defeasible rule
{bird(X )} ⇒ fly(X )
(which might be read as “Birds usually can fly”) to be more understandable than
its logic program counterpart:
fly(X )← bird(X ),∼ ¬fly(X )
Such considerations are important when it comes to creating and maintaining
knowledge–based systems.
Defeasible logic is nevertheless relatively little known in the nonmonotonic rea-
soning (NMR) community, and relationships to more mainstream NMR formalisms
have been only partially studied. There are exceptions. Antoniou and Billington
(2001) have shown how an ambiguity propagating variant of BDL can be embed-
ded into default logic, and Brewka (2001) provided a simple scheme for translating
the same logic (though without “team defeat”) into logic programming under his
own prioritized well-founded semantics (Brewka 1996). Later, Antoniou et al. (2006)
provided an alternative embedding of defeasible theories into logic programs and
showed a relationship between the BDL-conclusions of theories and both the Kunen
(1987) and stable model semantics of their embeddings.
Similar analyses have not been performed for NDL and ADL, however. NDL was
not well known at the time Brewka’s paper was written, and ADL did not exist
until 2006. This is unfortunate, since these logics incorporate features not found
in other defeasible logics. Particularly, NDL and ADL include failure-by-looping, a
mechanism to weed out circular arguments. Its absence contributes greatly to the
low complexity of the other logics, but it also means that the logics fail to draw
reasonable conclusions in some cases. E.g., if given the single rule
{p} → p
and nothing else, then the earlier defeasible logics would be unable to conclude
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anything at all about p; it is neither provable nor refutable in these logics. How-
ever, based on the rule alone, there’s no reason to believe p, and so it should be
unprovable. Both NDL and ADL are able to show this.
Failure-by-looping is conceptually similar to the notion of an unfounded set in
the well-founded semantics (WFS) for logic programs (Van Gelder et al. 1991). In-
deed, a recognition of this is what led to the development of adequate semantics
(Maier 2010) for both NDL and ADL—semantics which are based explicitly on
the WFS. Historically, defeasible logics have been defined proof-theoretically, with
semantics coming only later. Prior to 2006, the only semantics offered for NDL
(Donnelly 1999) was sound but incomplete, even for finite propositional theories.
Given the similarity of the semantics for NDL and ADL to the WFS for logic
programs, it is natural to inquire whether each formalism can be translated into
the other. For proponents of defeasible logic, the benefit of interdefinability with
logic programs would be that preexisting logic program reasoners—such as XSB
(Sagonas et al.1994) or smodels (Syrja¨nen and Niemela¨ 2001)—could be used to
draw conclusions according to defeasible logic, and many of the theoretical results
already known about logic programs could be applied to defeasible theories. For
proponents of logic programming, the benefit of interdefinability would be that re-
sults known about defeasible logic could be applied to logic programs. Furthermore,
interdefinability would allow certain programs to be represented in a more concise
and intuitively acceptable manner.
The present paper takes up interdefinability and related issues. It is shown here
that for a restricted class of defeasible theories (those with minimal conflict sets,
no defeaters, and no priorities on rules) the semantics for ADL corresponds to the
WFS for normal logic programs. That is, there exists a rather natural translation
of a defeasible theory into a logic program (under the WFS) that preserves the
ADL-consequences of the theory. It is also shown that a consequence preserving
translation exists in the other direction. The closed-world assumption of the WFS
is easily represented as a set of defeasible rules with empty bodies. And so, given
the restrictions, either formalism can be embedded into the other.
We also define antimonotone operators α and β for defeasible theories (with α
propagating ambiguity and β blocking it) and show that when unprioritized de-
feasible theories are translated into logic programs, α coincides with the Gelfond–
Lifschitz operator γ (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988). Given this and the correspon-
dence between ADL and the WFS, it immediately follows that an alternating fix-
point procedure based on α can be used on unprioritized theories to generate the
consequences according to ADL. This parallels the known relationship between
γ and the WFS (Baral and Subrahmanian 1993). Additionally, a similar fixpoint
procedure, based on β, exactly captures the consequences according to NDL. Both
operators can be used to define stable model semantics for defeasible theories.
Given that NDL blocks ambiguity and both ADL and the WFS propagate it, it
is no surprise that there is no correspondence between the NDL-consequences of a
defeasible theory and the well-founded model of its logic program counterpart. In
general, the consequences according to the WFS and ADL are a subset of those
according to NDL. However, using the same scheme to translate logic programs
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into defeasible theories, NDL can be viewed as indirectly providing an ambiguity
blocking semantics for logic programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2, 3 and 4 give
overviews, respectively, of logic programming with the WFS, the syntax of defea-
sible logic (in general), and the semantics of NDL and ADL (in particular). The
consequence-preserving translations of defeasible theories into logic programs (and
vice versa) are given in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 presents the operators α and
β. The correspondence between α and γ is proven, as is the relationship between β
and the semantics for NDL. The operators are used in Section 8 to define seman-
tics for defeasible theories akin to the stable model semantics. We conclude with
a brief discussion of related work, discussing in particular the differences between
ADL/NDL and other versions of defeasible logic.
Two appendices are also included. The first presents the proof systems for NDL
and ADL. The second shows how defeasible theories can be transformed into equiv-
alent ones lacking defeaters, extended conflict sets, and priorities on rules. Given
this, it follows that α and logic programs under the WFS can both be used to
compute all of the ADL consequences of defeasible theories.
2 The WFS for normal logic programs
A normal logic program Π consists of rules of the form
a ← b1, b2, . . . , bn ,∼ c1,∼ c2, . . . ,∼ cm
where n and m are nonnegative integers, a and each bi and ci are first order atomic
formulas, and ∼ is default negation; each ci is a default literal. In the original WFS,
an interpretation I of program Π may be represented as a tuple 〈T,U〉, where T
and U are disjoint sets of atoms. Interpretations are thus 3-valued; an atom p is
true if it is in T, false if it is in U, and undefined otherwise. Interpretations in
defeasible logic are similar, but in defeasible logic T and U can contain a mix of
atoms and their negations (and so it is somewhat awkward to speak of truth and
falsity). To avoid confusion, we will say that elements of T are well-founded and
those of U are unfounded. What remains is said to be ambiguous. The WFS selects
one interpretation to serve as the canonical model (the well-founded model) of the
program. Every program is guaranteed to have exactly one well-founded model.
In the following discussion, we assume that logic programs contain only ground
terms, and that the number of rules in the program is countable. At(Π) is the set
of ground atoms associated with a program, while Lit(Π) is defined to be At(Π) ∪
{¬p|p ∈ At(Π)}. The literal ¬p is the classical complement of atom p. When it is
necessary to talk about a literal and its complement in a general way, we will use
of the following notation: If p is an atom a, then p is ¬a. If p is ¬a, where a is an
atom, then p is a.
The expressions head(r) and body(r) refer, respectively, to the head and body
of the rule r , and body(r)− and body(r)+ refer, respectively, to the default and
non-default literals of body(r). Similarly, r+ is r with all default literals removed.
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An NAF-free (or definite) logic program is a normal logic program containing no
default literals.
If T and U are allowed to overlap in interpretations, then the set of all interpre-
tations forms a complete lattice under the relation ⊑, where
〈T1,U1〉 ⊑ 〈T2,U2〉 iff T1 ⊆ T2 and U1 ⊆ U2.
This is the so-called knowledge ordering. The bottom ⊥ of the lattice is 〈∅,∅〉
and the top ⊤ is 〈At(Π),At(Π)〉. The well-founded model of Π is defined using the
operators UΠ, TΠ, and WΠ, all of which are monotone on the lattice. TΠ is the
immediate consequence operator.
TΠ(I) = {head(r) | r ∈ Π, body(r)
+ ⊆ T, and body(r)− ⊆ U}.
UΠ and WΠ are defined via unfounded sets, which intuitively are sets for which
no external support exists. If Π is a normal logic program and I = 〈T,U〉 an
interpretation, then a set S ⊆ At(Π) is an unfounded set of Π wrt interpretation I
iff for each p ∈ S and each rule r ∈ Π with head p, either:
1. there is a q ∈ body(r)+ such that q ∈ U ∪ S , or
2. there is a q ∈ body(r)− such that q ∈ T.
Unfounded sets are closed under union. UΠ(I) is the greatest unfounded set of Π
wrt I:
UΠ(I) =
⋃
{A | A is an unfounded set of Π with respect to I}.
UΠ(I) and TΠ(I) are disjoint, and WΠ combines them to form a new interpre-
tation:
WΠ(I) = 〈TΠ(I),UΠ(I)〉
Beginning with ⊥, the following sequence (I0, I1, . . .) is defined using WΠ.
1. I0 =WΠ ↑ 0 = 〈∅,∅〉
2. Iα+1 =WΠ ↑ α+ 1 =WΠ(Iα) (for successor ordinals)
3. Iα =WΠ ↑ α = 〈
⋃
β<α
Tβ ,
⋃
β<α
Uβ〉 (for limit ordinals)
The well-founded model wfm(Π) of Π is defined to be WΠ ↑ λ, where λ is the
closure ordinal of the sequence—i.e. the least λ such that WΠ ↑ λ = WΠ ↑ (λ+ 1).
Since WΠ is monotone on the lattice of interpretations, then by the Knaster-Tarski
Theorem (Tarski 1955), least lfp(WΠ) and greatest gfp(WΠ) fixpoints of WΠ exist.
The well-founded model may equivalently be defined as lfp(WΠ).
Example 1
1. p ←∼ q0
2. qn ← qn+1 (for all n ∈ N0, where N0 is the set of nonnegative integers.)
The well-founded model of the above infinite program is 〈{p}, {qn |n ∈ N0}〉.
Clearly, each qi is intuitively unfounded. In fact, U1 = {qn |n ∈ N0}. Given this,
p ∈ TΠ(I1) (in other words, p ∈ T2). The closure ordinal of the sequence is 2.
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3 Defeasible logic
Like logic programs, defeasible logic deals with sets of rules, where the rules are
composed of sets of ground literals (atoms and their classical complements). Unlike
logic programs, however, defeasible logic allows three sorts of rules. If S is a finite
set of literals and p is a literal, then S → p is a strict rule, S ⇒ p a defeasible rule,
and S  p an (undercutting) defeater. We may read S → p as saying “If S , then
definitely p,” S ⇒ p as “If S , then defeasibly (normally, apparently, evidently) p”,
and S  p as “If S, then maybe p. Strict rules with empty bodies are called facts
and defeasible rules with empty bodies are called presumptions. The rule ∅ ⇒ p
may be read as saying “Presumably, p.”
Defeasible logic is intended to be a logic of justification, and in our view, such a
logic must be nonmonotonic. From an intuitive standpoint, it is possible for a belief
to be justified and nevertheless false, and it is also possible for a belief that was
once justified to lose its justification—not because its support has been rejected,
but because new information has come to light which either contradicts the belief
directly or else undermines it by contradicting its support.
This basic intuition is captured in defeasible logic by allowing defeasible rules to
be defeated by other rules. Given the rules
1. ∅→ lives alone
2. ∅→ has a wife
3. {lives alone} ⇒ ¬married
4. {has a wife} → married
it is reasonable to conclude lives alone and has a wife, as both are facts. However,
we cannot, on pain of contradiction, simultaneously detach the heads of both of the
latter two rules. In defeasible logic, to detach the head of rule 3, we must first show
that rule 4 cannot be applied. This, in fact, we cannot do. Though the different
defeasible logics might formalize the intuition differently, rule 3 is defeasible and
rule 4 is strict, and rule 4 defeats rule 3. In each logic, one can conclude married
but not ¬married .
The heads of defeaters can never be detached—defeaters exist solely to pre-
vent the application of a conflicting defeasible rule. For example, the defeater ¬
has-intact-flight-feathers  ¬flies might be used to prevent a proof of flies from
{bird} ⇒ flies , but it cannot be used to directly prove ¬flies .
Strict, defeasible, and defeater rules are collected into defeasible theories. Below,
if D is a defeasible theory, then At(D) and Lit(D) are defined as they are in logic
programming: At(D) is the set of atoms associated with D , while Lit(D) is the set
of literals.
Definition 1
A defeasible theory D is a triple 〈R,C ,≺〉, where R is a countable set of rules, C is
a countable set of finite sets of literals in Lit(D) such that for any literal p ∈ At(D),
{p,¬p} ∈ C , and ≺ is an acyclic binary relation over the non-strict rules in R.
The elements of C are called conflict sets. It is these which determine incompati-
bilities in defeasible theories. Simply put, a collection of rules conflict if their heads
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constitute a conflict set. The priority relation ≺ is used to resolve conflicts between
non-strict rules, and it is this relation which in part determines which rules can
be used to defeat others. Different versions of defeasible logic specify precisely how
these components are used.
We call a conflict set of the form {p,¬p} a minimal conflict set, and we use CMIN
to indicate that no conflict sets other than the minimal ones are defined in a given
defeasible theory. We say that conflict sets are closed under strict rules if, for all
c ∈ C , if A → p is a rule and p ∈ c, then (A ∪ c − {p}) ∈ C . It is expensive to
close conflict sets under the strict rules of a theory, but it is often necessary to do
so in order to draw reasonable conclusions. The non-minimal conflict sets are called
extended conflict sets. The predecessors of NDL and ADL, including BDL and its
variants, do not allow extended conflict sets.
For a given theory, Rs , Rd , and Ru refer to the strict, defeasible, and defeater
rules of R, respectively, while Rs [p], Rd [p], and Ru [p] refer to those rules with head
p. C [p] denotes the set of conflict sets containing p. The expression p refers to the
complement of p.
4 Well-founded semantics for ADL and NDL
The proof systems for ADL and NDL are presented in Appendix A. We will not
discuss them further here other than to say that adequate semantics (presented
below) corresponding to the logics did not exist until recently (Maier 2010). The
proof systems for NDL and ADL are sound relative to their counterpart semantics,
and while completeness does not hold in general, the proof systems are complete for
the class of locally finite theories (defined in Appendix A). The restricted nature of
the completeness result is unsurprising, since proofs in defeasible logic are required
to be finite structures, while no counterpart restriction exists for the semantics.
As Example 2 illustrates, NDL and ADL differ in how ambiguity is handled.
Example 2
D = 〈R,CMIN ,∅〉, R is
1. ∅⇒ p
2. ∅⇒ ¬p
3. {p} ⇒ ¬q
4. ∅⇒ q
The first two defeasible rules in the example are vacuously supported and con-
flict, and there is no mechanism for choosing between them. The literals p and
¬p are ambiguous in an intuitive sense, and there is some debate in the literature
regarding the proper handling of ambiguity. It is clear that neither p nor ¬p should
be considered justified. One possible course of action is to consider both p and ¬p
as refuted, which effectively blocks or localizes the ambiguity to just those literals.
This is the course taken by Horty (Horty et al. 1990) and by most forms of defeasi-
ble logic, including NDL. If one does this, then since p is refuted, all support for ¬q
vanishes, and only q is left with any support. Indeed, under the ambiguity blocking
view, q is proved while ¬q is refuted.
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Alternatively, one could simply refrain from concluding anything at all about p
and ¬p. Since the status of ¬q depends upon resolving the status of p, the ambiguity
of p is effectively propagated to ¬q. This is the course taken by ADL. Adopting
ambiguity propagation yields in a sense a more extreme form of skepticism, in that
fewer conclusions can be drawn. In the example, p might hold (there is conflicting
information about it and no way to resolve the conflict), and if it does hold, then
there would be evidence for both q and ¬q, and so q and ¬q would be ambiguous.
The WFS for logic programs is also ambiguity propagating. The following logic
program Π is the most-natural counterpart to the above defeasible theory.
1. p ←∼ ¬p
2. ¬p ←∼ p
3. ¬q ←∼ q, p
4. q ←∼ ¬q
If ¬p and ¬q are simply treated as atoms (which is what the original WFS would
do), it can be seen that no non-empty subset of At(Π) is an unfounded set relative
to ⊥ = 〈∅,∅〉. Furthermore, TΠ(⊥) is empty. As this is so, the well-founded model
of the program is simply ⊥.
We note that in Example 2, the ambiguity of p and ¬p can be resolved by
specifying that either rule 1 or 2 takes priority over the other. For instance, if
2 ≺ 1, then both NDL and ADL would conclude p, and ¬p would be refuted. In
both logics, q and ¬q would still be ambiguous, because neither rule 3 nor 4 is
superior to the other.
The semantics for both NDL and ADL are based explicitly on the WFS. As
noted earlier, the components T and U of interpretations are allowed to contain
negative literals. The set of interpretations still forms a complete lattice under ⊑,
with ⊤ now being 〈Lit(D),Lit(D)〉. The operators UD , TD , and WD , as well as
the underlying notion of unfounded set, are recast to apply to defeasible theories.
Somewhat surprisingly, the difference between the semantics for NDL and that
for ADL lies solely in how unfounded sets are defined. It is this definition that
determines whether ambiguity is blocked or propagated.
Definition 2
A set S ⊆ Lit(D) is unfounded in NDL with respect to D and an interpretation
I = 〈T,U〉 iff for all literals p ∈ S :
1. For every r ∈ Rs [p], body(r) ∩ (U ∪ S ) 6= ∅.
2. For every r ∈ Rd [p],
(a) body(r) ∩ (U ∪ S ) 6= ∅, or
(b) there is a c ∈ C [p] such that for each q ∈ c − {p} there is a rule
s ∈ R[q] such that
i body(s) ⊆ T and,
ii s ⊀ r .
The definition of unfounded set in ADL is exactly the same as for NDL, save that
condition 2(b)ii is replaced with the following requirement: r ≺ s or s is strict.
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Examining the definition above and Example 2, it can be seen that {p,¬p} is an
unfounded set in NDL relative to D and interpretation 〈∅,∅〉. It is not unfounded
according to ADL, however.
Given an account of unfounded set, UD is defined identically for NDL and ADL.
UD(I) =
⋃
{S | S is an unfounded set wrt D and I}
The immediate consequence operator for NDL and ADL is defined in terms of
witnesses of provability.
Definition 3
If D is a defeasible theory and I = 〈T,U〉 an interpretation, then a rule r ∈ RD is
a witness of provability for p wrt D and I if one of the below conditions applies.
1. r ∈ Rs [p] and body(r) ⊆ T.
2. r ∈ Rd [p] and body(r) ⊆ T, and for each conflict set c ∈ C [p], there exists a
q ∈ c − {p} such that for all s ∈ R[q], s ≺ r or body(s) ∩ U 6= ∅.
Given this, the immediate consequences of D wrt I, written TD (I), is the set
TD (I) = {p| there exists a witness of provability for p wrt D and I}.
The account of the operator W remains unchanged from the WFS:
WD (I) = 〈TD (I),UD (I)〉
Furthermore, WD may be used to define the monotonically increasing sequence
(I0, I1, . . .). The sequence is coherent, in the sense that Tα ∩Uα = ∅ for any α ≥ 0.
As in the WFS, the well–founded model of the defeasible theory is defined to be
the least fixpoint lfp(WD ) of WD :
wfm(D) =def lfp(WD )
Again, it is the case that this fixpoint coincides with the limit of the above sequence.
The well-founded models of defeasible theories (under NDL or ADL) can be
viewed as defining both a consequence relation |≈ and an “anti-consequence” rela-
tion ≈|. Analogous relations (|≈WFS and ≈|WFS ) can be defined for normal logic
programs under the WFS.
Definition 4
Let D be a defeasible theory, L one of NDL or ADL, and wfm(D) = 〈T,U〉 D ’s
well-founded model according to L.
1. D |≈L p iff p ∈ T, and
2. D ≈|L p iff p ∈ U.
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5 Translating Defeasible Theories into Logic Programs
In the scheme used by Brewka (2001) to translate defeasible theories into logic
programs, every defeasible rule S ⇒ p becomes p ←∼ p, S , and every strict rule
S → p becomes p ← S . The result of the transformation is a so-called extended logic
program (which allows both ∼ and ¬ to be used). Several examples are presented to
demonstrate that the two systems do not always agree, and Brewka argues that the
results of the defeasible logic are less reasonable. The particular logic investigated
by Brewka is an ambiguity propagating variant of BDL (without team defeat, a
feature we have not discussed). Brewka dismisses other variants of defeasible logic
without discussing them in any detail, mainly because these logics are ambiguity
blocking.
Brewka’s translation scheme assumes minimal conflict sets. Below, we alter it to
encompass theories with extended conflict sets, and we use this modified scheme to
compare ADL to the simple WFS, i.e., not to Brewka’s prioritized variant. Since
conflict sets are sufficient to encode negation, we will assume that all negative
literals are just atoms. Furthermore, since defeaters and priorities on rules are not
defined for the simple WFS, we assume that no defeaters occur in the theory and
that ≺ is empty.
Definition 5
Let D = 〈R,C ,≺〉 be a defeasible theory. For any literal p ∈ Lit(D),
Prod(C [p]) = {{a1, . . . , am}|(a1, . . . , am) ∈ c1 − {p} × . . .× cm − {p}}
where C [p] = {c1, . . . , cm}
Prod(C [p]) is the set of all sets that can be created by taking a single literal
(other than p) from each conflict set containing p (the order in the n-ary product
above does not matter). We use these sets when translating defeasible rules of a
theory into logic program rules. In order to ensure that the rules in the translation
are finite in length, we require that C [p] is finite for each p ∈ Lit(D).
Definition 6
Let D = 〈R,C ,∅〉 be a defeasible theory such that Ru = ∅ and C [p] is finite for
each p ∈ Lit(D). The logic program translation ΠD of D is the smallest rule-set
such that
1. If {q1, . . . , qn} → p ∈ Rs , then p ← q1, . . . , qn ∈ ΠD .
2. If {q1, . . . , qn} ⇒ p ∈ Rd and {a1, . . . , am} ∈ Prod(C [p]), then
p ←∼ a1, . . . ,∼ am , q1, . . . , qn ∈ ΠD .
Let trans(r) denote the set of logic program rules obtained from rule r of the
defeasible theory. If we ignore notational differences, then trans(r) = {r} if r is
strict. For the sake of convenience, we will simply say that trans(r) = r . Normally, if
r is defeasible, then trans(r) will contain many rules, but if conflict sets are minimal,
then it again holds that trans(r) contains only a single rule. In the translation of a
defeasible rule r , each ai is a literal of some conflict set containing p.
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5.1 Soundness and Completeness of ADL wrt WFS
Provided C [p] is finite for each p ∈ Lit(D), ADL is sound wrt the WFS. If in
addition conflict sets are minimal, ADL is complete wrt the WFS.
Below, since the operators for the WFS have direct analogs for defeasible logic and
are defined individually for each logic program and defeasible theory, we can use the
same basic symbols for each (writing, for instance, TD and TΠ) without causing
confusion. We will use (ID,0, ID,1, . . .) to denote the sequence of interpretations
obtained using WD , and (IΠ,0, IΠ,1, . . .) to denote the sequence of interpretations
obtained using WΠ. For a given interpretation IΠ,λ, we will write TΠ,λ and UΠ,λ to
distinguish well-founded and unfounded sets. We will also sometimes indicate the
well-founded model of a given theory D (or program Π) by writing ID,WF (IΠ,WF ).
Proposition 1 (Soundness of ADL wrt WFS )
LetD = 〈R,C ,∅〉 be a defeasible theory such that Ru = ∅ and for each p ∈ Lit(D),
C [p] is finite. Let Π be the logic program translation of D . For any p ∈ Lit(D),
1. if D |≈ADL p, then Π |≈WFS p, and
2. if D ≈|ADL p, then Π ≈|WFS p.
Proof
The proof is by induction on the sequence (ID,0, ID,1, . . .), showing that for all
λ ≥ 0, if p ∈ TD,λ (p ∈ UD,λ), then p ∈ TΠ,WF (p ∈ UΠ,WF ). Since ID,0 = IΠ,0, the
claim holds for λ = 0. Suppose it holds for all κ < λ. We may assume wlog that λ
is a successor ordinal. There are two cases to consider.
1. Suppose p ∈ TD,λ. Then there exists an r ∈ R[p] such that body(r) ⊆ TD,λ−1 and
either (1) r is strict or else (2) r is defeasible and for each conflict set c ∈ C [p],
there exists a q ∈ c−{p} such that for all s ∈ R[q], body(s)∩UD,λ−1 6= ∅. In both
cases, body(r) ⊆ TΠ,WF by the inductive hypothesis. As such, for any r
′ ∈ trans(r),
body(r ′)+ ⊆ TΠ,WF . If r is strict then body(r
′)+ = body(r ′) and so by definition of
TΠ, p ∈ TΠ,WF .
Suppose, instead, that r is defeasible, and let c ∈ C [p]. Then there exists a q ∈
c − {p} such that for each s ∈ R[q], body(s) ∩ UD,λ−1 6= ∅. Let s ′ ∈ trans(s).
Since body(s) = body(s ′)+, it follows that body(s ′)+ ∩ UD,λ−1 6= ∅. By inductive
hypothesis, body(s ′)+ ∩ UΠ,WF 6= ∅. Generalizing on s ′ and then s , every rule for
q in Π has a non-default literal in UΠ,WF , and so by definition of UΠ, q ∈ UΠ,WF .
Generalizing on c, every conflict set for p has a literal q 6= p such that q ∈ UΠ,WF .
Let Q = {q1, . . . , qm} be the set of such literals. Obviously, Q ∈ Prod(C [p]), and
so there is a rule r ′ ∈ trans(r) such that body(r ′)+ = body(r) and body(r ′)− = Q .
Since body(r ′)+ ⊆ TΠ,WF , and Q ⊆ UΠ,WF , it follows that p ∈ TΠ,WF .
2. Suppose p ∈ UD,λ and let b be any literal in UD,λ. UD,λ is by definition unfounded
wrt D and ID,λ−1. If r ∈ Rs [b], then there is a q ∈ body(r) such that q ∈ UD,λ ∪
UD,λ−1. UD is monotone, and so q ∈ UD,λ.
Suppose r ∈ Rd [b]. Then either (1) there is a q ∈ body(r) such that q ∈ UD,λ, or
(2) there is a conflict set c ∈ C [b] such that for all a ∈ c−{b}, there is a s ∈ Rs [a]
such that body(s) ⊆ TD,λ−1 (s must be strict since the priority relation is empty).
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Suppose (2) holds. By inductive hypothesis, body(s) ⊆ TΠ,WF . Since s is strict,
trans(s) = s and so a ∈ TΠ,WF . Recall that by definition of Prod(C [b]), for each
set Q ∈ Prod(C [b]) we have Q ∩ c − {b} 6= ∅. By definition of trans(r), for each
t ∈ trans(r), there exists a Q ∈ Prod(C [b]) such that Q = body(t)−. Since this is
so, if (2) holds then for each rule r ′ ∈ trans(r), there exists a a ∈ body(r ′)− such
that a ∈ TΠ,WF .
Generalizing on r , every logic program rule r ′ for b has a classical literal q ∈
body(r ′)+ such that q ∈ UD,λ, or else a default literal a ∈ body(r
′)− such that
a ∈ TΠ,WF . Generalizing on b, by definition of unfounded sets for logic programs,
UD,λ is an unfounded set relative to Π and IΠ,WF , and so UD,λ ⊆ UΠ,WF . Since
p ∈ UD,λ, p ∈ UΠ,WF .
As noted, the claim of soundness pertains to defeasible theories with extended
conflict sets, provided that C [p] is finite for all p. The other specific requirements
are that no defeaters are used and that the rules are unprioritized. Completeness
requires more, however. Specifically, conflict sets must also be minimal.
Example 3
Consider the following unprioritized defeasible theory and its corresponding logic
program, and suppose that the conflicts sets {p,¬p}, {q,¬q}, {q,¬p} are used.
1. ∅→ p
2. ∅⇒ ¬p
3. ∅⇒ q
4. {q} → p
1. p
2. ¬p ←∼ p
3. q ←∼ ¬q,∼ ¬p
4. p ← q
In the defeasible theory, p is a fact, and so the presumption of ¬p is defeated. Nev-
ertheless, it is supported, and this is sufficient to prevent q from being concluded—q
is ambiguous according to ADL. In the logic program, however, both p and q are
well-founded. And so the two formalisms disagree. In contrast, if the conflict sets
are minimal, the defeasible theory and corresponding logic program yield the same
results. Examples such as above are problematic for ADL and NDL, as the result
produced by the logic program is intuitively more reasonable than the one produced
by the defeasible theory with conflict sets closed under strict rules. We pick up this
topic again in Section 9.
Before we prove that ADL is complete with respect to the WFS—subject to the
restrictions noted above—we need to prove the following small lemma.
Lemma 1
Let D = 〈R,C ,∅〉 be a defeasible theory such that Ru = ∅ and the conflict sets
of C are minimal. For all p ∈ Lit(D), if r ∈ Rd [p], body(r) ⊆ TWF , and p ∈ UWF ,
then p ∈ TWF .
Proof
Suppose r ∈ Rd [p] and body(r) ⊆ TWF and p ∈ UWF . Then there must be some
least successor ordinal λ such that body(r) ⊆ Tλ and p ∈ Uλ. Recall that Uλ is
the greatest unfounded set wrt Iλ−1. Suppose for a proof by contradiction that
p /∈ Tλ+1. By definition of unfounded set (and since C = CMIN ) we have,
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1. for all s ∈ Rs [p], body(s) ∩ (Uλ ∪ Uλ−1) 6= ∅, and
2. for all s ∈ Rd [p], either
(a) body(s) ∩ (Uλ ∪ Uλ−1) 6= ∅, or
(b) there is a rule t ∈ Rs [p] such that body(t) ⊆ Tλ−1.
Since UD is monotone, body(s) ∩ (Uλ ∪ Uλ−1) reduces to body(s) ∩ Uλ. If 2b above
holds, then p ∈ Tλ and so p ∈ Tλ+1. As such, r ∈ Rd [p] and body(r) ⊆ Tλ, and it
must be that for each rule s ∈ R[p], body(s) ∩ Uλ 6= ∅. But this implies (via TD )
that p ∈ Tλ+1. This is a contradiction, and so (again) p ∈ Tλ+1.
Proposition 2 (Completeness)
Let D = 〈R,C ,∅〉 be a defeasible theory such that Ru = ∅ and the conflict sets of
C are minimal. Let Π be the logic program translation of D . For all p ∈ Lit(D),
1. if Π |≈WFS p, then D |≈ADL p, and
2. if Π ≈|WFS p, then D ≈|ADL p.
Proof
The proof is by induction on the sequence (IΠ,0, IΠ,1,. . .), showing that for all
λ ≥ 0, if p ∈ TΠ,λ (p ∈ UΠ,λ), then p ∈ TD,WF (p ∈ UD,WF ). Since ID,0 = IΠ,0,
the clam holds for λ = 0. Suppose it holds for all κ < λ. We may assume that λ is
a successor ordinal.
1. Suppose p ∈ TΠ,λ. Then there is a rule s ∈ trans(r) for some r ∈ R[p] such that
body(s)+ ⊆ TΠ,λ−1 and body(s)
− ⊆ UΠ,λ−1. By inductive hypothesis, body(s)
+ ⊆
TD,WF and body(s)
− ⊆ UD,WF . If body(s)
− = ∅, then r ∈ Rs [p] and body(r) =
body(s), and so p ∈ TD,WF by definition of ID,WF and TD . If body(s)
− 6= ∅, since
conflict sets are minimal, it must be that body(s)− = {p}. And so p ∈ UD,WF .
Since body(s)+ = body(r), by Lemma 1, p ∈ TD,WF .
2. Suppose p ∈ UΠ,λ. Let a be a literal of UΠ,λ and let r
′ ∈ trans(r) for some r ∈ R[a].
If r ∈ Rs [a], then since UΠ is monotone and UΠ,λ is unfounded relative to IΠ,λ−1,
there exists a b ∈ body(r ′)+ such that b ⊆ UΠ,λ. Thus there exists a b ∈ body(r)
such that b ∈ UΠ,λ.
Suppose that r is defeasible. Then either (1) there exists a classical b ∈ body(r ′)
such that b ∈ UΠ,λ, or else (2) the literal ∼ a appears in body(r
′) and a ∈ TΠ,λ−1.
If (1), then body(r)∩UΠ,λ 6= ∅. If (2) then by the inductive hypothesis a ∈ TD,WF ,
and so there must be a rule s ∈ R[a] such that body(s) ⊆ TD,WF and either (2.1) s
is strict or else (2.2) for all rules t ∈ R[a] (including t = r), body(t) ∩ UD,WF 6= ∅.
Generalizing on r , for each rule r ∈ Rs [a], body(r)∩ (UΠ,λ ∪UD;WF ) 6= ∅. For each
r ∈ Rd [a], either body(r)∩(UΠ,λ∪UD;WF ) 6= ∅ or else there exists an s ∈ Rs [a] and
body(s) ⊆ TD,WF . Generalizing on a, UΠ,λ is unfounded wrt D and ID,WF , and so
UΠ,λ ⊆ UD(ID,WF ). Since ID,WF is a fixpoint of WD , we have UΠ,λ ⊆ UD,WF and
hence p ∈ UD,WF .
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6 Translating Logic Programs into Defeasible Theories
A translation in the other direction is also possible. That is, normal logic programs
under the WFS can also be translated into defeasible theories under ADL so that the
canonical models of each agree. We show this by first translating the normal logic
program into an equivalent extended logic program encoding the closed-world as-
sumption. We then show the equivalence between the ADL theory and the extended
program. Below, though both ∼ and ¬ appear in the extended logic program, we
intend the original WFS to be used on the programs—a literal ¬p is simply taken
as another atom.
Definition 7
Let Π be a normal program. The explicit version of Π is the smallest extended
program Φ such that
1. If p ← a1, . . . , an ,∼ b1, . . . ,∼ bm appears in Π, then
p ← a1, . . . , an ,¬b1, . . . ,¬bm appears in Φ.
2. For each p ∈ At(Π), the rule ¬p ←∼ p appears in Φ.
The following lemmas relate the well-founded models of Π and Φ and make the
translation of Π into a defeasible theory DΠ apparent (Definition 8).
Lemma 2
Let Π be a normal program and Φ its explicit version. For any b ∈ At(Π) and any
ordinal λ ≥ 0,
1. ¬b ∈ TΦ,λ iff there exists a κ < λ such that b ∈ UΦ,κ.
2. ¬b ∈ UΦ,λ iff there exists a κ < λ such that b ∈ TΦ,κ.
Proof
1. Suppose ¬b ∈ TΦ,λ for some ordinal λ. Then there exists a least successor ordinal
κ ≤ λ such that ¬b ∈ TΦ,κ. As ¬b ←∼ b is the only rule with head ¬b, it must be
the case that b ∈ UΦ,κ−1.
Now suppose there is an ordinal κ < λ such that b ∈ UΦ,κ. Since ¬b ←∼ b is
a rule in Φ, it must be the case that ¬b ∈ TΦ,κ+1. Either κ + 1 = λ, or else by
monotonicity of the sequence (I) we have ¬b ∈ TΦ,λ.
2. Suppose ¬b ∈ UΦ,λ. Then there exists a least successor ordinal κ ≤ λ such that
¬b ∈ UΦ,κ. Since ¬b ←∼ b is the only rule in Φ with head ¬b, it must be the case
that b ∈ TΦ,κ−1.
Now suppose there is an ordinal κ < λ such that b ∈ TΦ,κ. As ¬b ←∼ b is the only
rule of Φ with head b, it must be the case that ¬b ∈ UΦ,κ+1. Either κ+ 1 = λ, or
else by monotonicity we have ¬b ∈ UΦ,λ.
It immediately follows from the above Lemma that Φ |≈WFS b iff Φ ≈|WFS ¬b, and
Φ |≈WFS ¬b iff Φ ≈|WFS b.
Lemma 3
Let Π be a normal program and Φ the explicit version of Π. For any b ∈ At(Π)
1. Π |≈WFS b iff Φ |≈WFS b.
2. Π ≈|WFS b iff Φ ≈|WFS b.
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Proof
(LR) The proof is by induction on the sequence (IΠ,0, IΠ,1, . . .). Suppose for all
κ < λ and all p ∈ At(Π), if p ∈ TΠ,κ, then p ∈ TΦ,WF ; if p ∈ UΠ,κ then p ∈ UΦ,WF .
We may assume wlog that λ is a successor ordinal.
1. Suppose p ∈ TΠ,λ. Then there is a rule r with head p such that body(r)
+ ⊆ TΠ,λ−1
and body(r)− ⊆ UΠ,λ−1. Let r
′ be the rule of Φ corresponding to r . By the inductive
hypothesis, body(r)+ ⊆ TΦ,WF and body(r)
− ⊆ UΦ,WF . By Lemma 2 for each
q ∈ body(r)− it follows that ¬q ∈ TΦ,WF . Since body(r)
+ ⊆ TΦ,WF and for each
q ∈ body(r)− we have ¬q ∈ TΦ,WF , it must be the case that body(r
′) ⊆ TΦ,WF .
Since r ′ is strict, then by definition of TΦ and IΦ,WF , p ∈ TΦ,WF .
2. Suppose p ∈ UΠ,λ. Let q ∈ At(Π) be any literal such that q ∈ UΠ,λ. Then for all
r ∈ RΠ[q] there is an a ∈ body(r)
+ such that a ∈ UΠ,λ or else a ∼ b ∈ body(r)
− such
that b ∈ TΠ,λ−1. If b ∈ TΠ,λ−1, then by the inductive hypothesis b ∈ TΦ,WF and so
from Lemma 2 ¬b ∈ UΦ,WF . Generalizing, for all rules r for q, each corresponding
rule r ′ has a classical literal a ∈ body(r ′) such that a ∈ UΠ,λ or else a (still classical
literal) ¬b such that ¬b ∈ UΦ,WF . Generalizing on q, UΠ,λ is unfounded wrt Φ and
IΦ,WF . As such, UΠ,λ ⊆ UΦ(IΦ,WF ) = UΦ,WF , and so p ∈ UΦ,WF .
(RL) The proof is by induction on the sequence (IΦ,0, IΦ,1, . . .). Suppose for all
κ < λ and p ∈ At(Π), if p ∈ TΦ,κ, then p ∈ TΠ,WF ; if p ∈ UΦ,κ then p ∈ UΠ,WF .
We may assume wlog that λ is a successor ordinal. Let p be any atom of At(Π).
1. Suppose p ∈ TΦ,λ. Then there is a rule r
′ with head p such that body(r ′) ⊆ TΦ,λ−1.
By Lemma 2, for each ¬b ∈ body(r ′), we have b ∈ UΦ,η for some η < λ. Let r be
the rule of Π corresponding to r ′. By the inductive hypothesis, body(r)+ ⊆ TΠ,WF
and body(r)− ⊆ UΠ,WF . By definition of TΠ and IΠ,WF , p ∈ TΠ,WF .
2. Now suppose p ∈ UΦ,λ and let q be any literal such that q ∈ UΦ,λ. If q is a classical
negative literal, then no rules for q appear in Π. Suppose q is an atom. Since
q ∈ UΦ,λ, for all rules r
′ with head q there is a classical literal a ∈ body(r) such
that a ∈ UΦ,λ. If a is of the form ¬b, then by Lemma 2, b ∈ TΦ,η for some η < λ.
By the inductive hypothesis, each such b is in TΠ,WF . Recall that if ¬b appears in
the body of r ′, then ∼ b appears in the corresponding rule r of Π. Generalizing on
r ′, for each rule r in Π with head q, there is an a ∈ body(r)+ such that a ∈ UΦ,λ,
or else a b ∈ body(r)− such that b ∈ TΠ,WF . Generalizing on q, UΦ,λ is unfounded
wrt Π and IΠ,WF . As such, UΦ,λ ⊆ UΠ(UΠ,WF ) = UΠ,WF , and so p ∈ UΠ,WF .
Definition 8
Let Π be a normal logic program. If rule r
p ← a1, . . . , an ,∼ b1, . . . ,∼ bm
appears in Π, then rDΠ is the rule
{a1, . . . , an ,¬b1, . . . ,¬bm} → p
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Definition 9
If Π is a normal logic program, then the defeasible theory translation DΠ of Π is
〈Str ∪ Pr ,CMIN ,∅〉, where
1. Str = {rDΠ |r ∈ Π}.
2. Pr = {∅⇒ ¬p|p ∈ At(Π)}.
The default literals in the program have become presumptions in the defeasible
theory. The rules of the original program are strict in the defeasible theory. It should
be obvious that translating DΠ back into a logic program using the Brewka inspired
scheme yields Φ. Given the soundness and completeness results of the last section
and also Lemma 2, it follows that p is well-founded in DΠ under ADL if and only
if ¬p is unfounded under ADL, and ¬p is well-founded in ADL if and only if p is
unfounded in ADL. Given Lemma 3, the results of DΠ under ADL agree with those
of Π wrt At(Π).
Proposition 3
If Π is a normal logic program, then for any p ∈ At(Π),
1. DΠ |≈ADL p iff DΠ ≈|ADL ¬p,
2. DΠ |≈ADL ¬p iff DΠ ≈|ADL p
Proof
Let Φ be the explicit normal form of Π, and suppose DΠ |≈ADL p. By Prop. 1,
Φ |≈WFS p. By Lemma 2, Φ ≈|WFS ¬p. By Prop. 2, DΠ ≈|ADL ¬p. Now suppose
DΠ ≈|ADL p. By Prop. 1, Φ ≈|WFS p. By Lemma. 2, Φ |≈WFS ¬p. By Prop. 2,
DΠ |≈ADL ¬p. The remaining cases are analogous.
Proposition 4
If Π is a normal logic program, then for any p ∈ At(Π),
1. Π |≈WFS p iff DΠ |≈ADL p.
2. Π ≈|WFS p iff DΠ ≈|ADL p.
Proof
Suppose DΠ |≈ADL p. Then Φ |≈WFS p by Prop. 1. By Lemma 3, Π |≈WFS p.
Now suppose Π |≈WFS p. Then Φ |≈WFS p by Lemma 3. By Prop. 2, DΠ |≈ADL p.
Again, the remaining cases are analogous.
Example 4
A logic program Π, its explicit form Φ, and its defeasible logic translation DΠ are
shown below.
Π Φ DΠ
1. p ←∼ q
2. q ←∼ p
1. p ← ¬q
2. q ← ¬p
3. ¬q ←∼ q
4. ¬p ←∼ p
1. {¬q} → p
2. {¬p} → q
3. ∅⇒ ¬q
4. ∅⇒ ¬p
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In the rules of Π, we have replaced each ∼ a (where a is an atom) with ¬a and
added the rules ¬a ←∼ a. The explicitly negative literals occur nowhere in Π. The
well-founded model of both Π and Φ is empty. In DΠ, in order to show ¬p, we must
first show that ¬q is unfounded, and furthermore, to show ¬q, we must first show
that ¬p is unfounded. Because of this nothing can be determined in ADL about p,
¬p, q, or ¬q.
7 Antimonotone Operators for ADL and NDL
The account of the WFS provided above is found in (Van Gelder et al. 1991). It is,
however, more typical today to present the WFS in terms of the so-called Gelfond-
Lifschitz (GL) operator γ, which was first defined for the stable model semantics
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988). In this section, we review the definition of γ and use
it to define ambiguity blocking and propagating operators for defeasible theories.
With some restrictions, these can be used to calculate the consequences of theories
according to ADL and NDL. As shown in the next section, they can also be used
to define stable model semantics for defeasible theories.
The GL operator γ works with Herbrand interpretations—sets of ground atoms.
If S is a Herbrand interpretation, then atom p is true in S if p ∈ S , and false if
p /∈ S . If Π is a normal logic program and S a Herbrand interpretation, then
γΠ(S ) =def TΠS ↑ ω
where ΠS is the so-called reduct of Π wrt S . Specifically, ΠS is the NAF-free
program obtained by
1. deleting from Π all rules r such that body(r)− ∩ S 6= ∅.
2. deleting all remaining default literals.
For an NAF-free program Π, the immediate consequence operator TΠ reduces to
TΠ(S ) =def {head(r)| r ∈ Π and body(r) ⊆ S}
The sequence TΠ ↑ 0, TΠ ↑ 1, . . ., is defined for ordinals λ ≥ 0.
1. TΠ ↑ 0 = ∅
2. TΠ ↑ λ+ 1 = TΠ(TΠ ↑ λ) (for successor ordinals λ+ 1)
3. TΠ ↑ λ =
⋃
κ<λTΠ ↑ κ (for limit ordinals λ)
The set of Herbrand interpretations forms a complete lattice under ⊆, and it is
also the case that TΠ is continuous on this lattice. As such, lfp(TΠ) = TP ↑ ω
(van Emden and Kowalski 1976). TΠ ↑ ω is sometimes written as Cl(Π), and so if
Π is normal, then γΠ(S ) = Cl(Π
S ).
The γ operator is antimonotone, and so γ2 is monotone. As shown by Baral and
Subrahmanian (1993), the well-founded model of Π can be defined in terms of γ2Π.
Specifically, wfm(Π) = 〈T,U〉, where T = lfp(γ2Π), and U = At(Π)− γΠ(T).
Like γ, the ambiguity propagating (α) and blocking (β) operators for defeasible
theories are defined using reducts and an immediate consequence operator. β is
defined for all defeasible theories, but α is only defined for a restricted class. We
consider α first.
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Definition 10
Let D = 〈R,C ,∅〉 be a defeasible theory such that Ru = ∅. If S ⊆ Lit(D), then
the α-reduct DSα of D wrt S is the set of rules Rs ∪ R
S
d , where
RSd = {r |r ∈ Rd and (∀c ∈ C [head(r)])(∃q ∈ c − {head(r)})(q /∈ S )}
Definition 11
Let R be a set of strict and defeasible rules taken from D . If S ⊆ Lit(D), then
TR(S ) =def {p|r ∈ R and body(r) ⊆ S}.
Definition 12
If R is a set of strict and defeasible rules, the sequence TR ↑ 0, TR ↑ 1, . . . is:
1. TR ↑ 0 = ∅
2. TR ↑ λ+ 1 = TR(TR ↑ λ) (for successor ordinals λ+ 1)
3. TR ↑ λ =
⋃
κ<λ
TR ↑ κ (for limit ordinals λ)
As with logic programs, where R is a set of (defeasible and strict rules) we define
Cl(R) as TR ↑ ω.
Definition 13
Let D = 〈R,C ,∅〉 be a defeasible theory such that Ru = ∅. For any S ⊆ Lit(D),
αD(S ) =def Cl(D
S
α ).
Under the translation of defeasible theories into logic programs, there is a corre-
spondence between α and γ. In order for the correspondence to hold, C [p] is still
required to be finite for each p ∈ Lit(D), and both Ru and ≺ must be empty.
Proposition 5
If D = 〈R,C ,∅〉 is a defeasible theory such that Ru = ∅ and C [p] is finite for each
p ∈ Lit(D), and if Π is the logic program translation of D , then for any S ⊆ Lit(D),
αD (S ) = γΠ(S ).
Proof
The proof proceeds by induction on the simple immediate consequence operator T
used to compute the closure of reducts. Note that this operator is continuous and
T ↑ ω =
⋃
n<ω
T ↑ n, and so it suffices to show that for each n < ω,
TΠS ↑ n = TDSα ↑ n.
The claim trivially holds for n = 0. Suppose it holds for all i < n and let p ∈ TDSα ↑
n. Then there is an r ∈ Rsd [p] in the reduct D
S
α such that body(r) ⊆ TDSα ↑ (n−1).
If r is strict, then there exists an r ′ ∈ Π such that r ′ = r (ignoring notational
differences; observe that body(r) = body(r ′)). Since r ′ lacks default literals, r ′ ∈ ΠS .
Since body(r) ⊆ TDSα ↑ (n−1), by the inductive hypothesis body(r) ⊆ TΠS ↑ (n−1),
and so by definition of the immediate consequence operator p ∈ TΠS ↑ n. If r is
defeasible, then for all c ∈ C [p], there exists a q ∈ c − {p} such that q /∈ S . As
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such, there exists a rule r ′ ∈ trans(r) such that for each ∼ b in the body of r ′ we
have b /∈ S . As this is so, r ′ ∈ ΠS and every default literal in the body of r ′ has
been deleted. And so body(r) = body(r ′). Since body(r) ⊆ TDSα ↑ (n − 1), by the
inductive hypothesis body(r) ⊆ TΠS ↑ (n − 1). It follows that p ∈ TΠS ↑ n.
Now suppose p ∈ TΠS ↑ n. Then there is a rule t ∈ Π
S such that body(t) ⊆ TΠS ↑
(n−1). If t corresponds to a strict rule of D, then t ∈ DSα and by inductive hypoth-
esis body(t) ⊆ TDSα ↑ (n − 1) and so by definition of the immediate consequence
operator p ∈ TDSα ↑ n. If t corresponds to a defeasible rule t
′, since t appears in
ΠS , it must be the case that every default literal of t has been deleted. This means
that for each conflict set c ∈ C [p] there is an element q ∈ c −{p} such that q /∈ S .
Since this is so, then by definition of DSα , t
′ ∈ DSα . By the inductive hypothesis,
body(t) ⊆ TDSα ↑ (n − 1) and so as before, p ∈ TDSα ↑ n.
Earlier, we showed a correspondence between the well-founded model for logic
programs and the well-founded model for ADL. This correspondence holds for the-
ories with minimal conflict sets and no defeaters or priorities on rules. Given the
correspondence just shown between α and the GL-operator γ, we can now see that
α can be used to determine the consequences of ADL for these theories. Note,
however, that in Proposition 5 conflict sets need not be minimal. In this way, the
operator defines a consequence relation that more generally corresponds to the
WFS consequences than does ADL. Returning to Example 3, the defeasible the-
ory’s well-founded model according to α coincides with the well-founded model of
the corresponding logic program. Both differ from the ADL-consequences of the
theory.
As shown in Appendix B, it is possible to transform a defeasible theory into an
equivalent one in which defeaters, priorities on rules, and extended conflict sets
do not appear. As this is so, α can in fact be used to compute the consequences
of theories according to ADL. Nevertheless, this is not as satisfying as having an
operator which more naturally corresponds to ADL, and we do not know at this
point whether α can be easily modified to serve this purpose.
Unlike α, the blocking operator β places no special restrictions on defeasible
theories. As shown below, the alternating fixpoint procedure defined with it can be
used to compute the well-founded model according to NDL.
Definition 14
Let D = 〈R,C ,≺〉 be a defeasible theory and S ⊆ Lit(D). The β–reduct of D wrt
S (written DSβ ) is Rs ∪ R
S
d , where R
S
d is the set of rules r such that
• r ∈ Rd , and
• (∀c ∈ C [head(r)])(∃q ∈ c − {head(r)})(∀s ∈ R[q])[body(s) * S or s ≺ r ]
Here, no defeaters are included in the reduct.
Definition 15
If D is a defeasible theory and S ⊆ Lit(D), then βD (S ) =def Cl(D
S
β ).
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Definition 16
Let D be a defeasible theory. We define the following sequence:
1. XD ↑ 0 =def ∅.
2. XD ↑ λ+ 1 =def β
2
D (XD ↑ λ) (for successor ordinals λ+ 1).
3. XD ↑ λ =def
⋃
κ<λ
XD ↑ κ (for limit ordinals λ).
Below, since we will only use a single theory D , we will omit D as a subscript,
writing, e.g., β(S ) instead of βD (S ). Furthermore, we will omit the β when writing
the blocking reduct of D wrt S , writing DS instead of DSβ . The α–reduct is never
used here, and so there will be no confusion.
Proposition 6
Let ID,WF = 〈TD,WF ,UD,WF 〉 be the wfm of defeasible theory D wrt NDL. For all
λ ≥ 0,
1. if p ∈ XD ↑ λ, then p ∈ TD,WF .
2. if p /∈ β(XD ↑ λ), then p ∈ UD,WF .
Proof
By definition of X ↑ 0, p /∈ X ↑ 0 for any p ∈ Lit(D). If p /∈ β(X ↑ 0) then it is
impossible to derive p from the rules of D under any circumstances, and so p is in
UD,WF . Suppose the hypothesis holds for all κ < λ. We prove each case.
1. Suppose p ∈ X ↑ λ. There must exist a least successor ordinal κ ≤ λ such that
p ∈ X ↑ κ. Recall that
X ↑ κ = β(β(X ↑ κ− 1)) = Cl(Dβ(X↑κ−1)) = TDβ(X↑κ−1) ↑ ω·
Suppose that for all i < m, if a ∈ TDβ(X↑κ−1) ↑ i , then a ∈ TD,WF (this obviously
holds for i = 0). Let p ∈ TDβ(X↑κ−1) ↑ m. Then there is an r in D
β(X↑κ−1) such
that body(r) ⊆ TDβ(X↑κ−1) ↑ (m − 1). By inductive hypothesis, body(r) ⊆ TD,WF .
If r is defeasible, then since r ∈ Dβ(X↑κ−1), for all conflict sets c ∈ C [p], there
exists a q ∈ c − {p} such that for each rule s ∈ R[q], either s ≺ r or body(s) *
β(X ↑ κ− 1). If the latter, then by inductive hypothesis, body(s) ∩ UD,WF 6= ∅.
So, there is a rule r of D such that r is strict and body(r) ⊆ TD,WF , or else r
is defeasible, body(r) ⊆ TD,WF , and for all conflict sets c ∈ C [p], there exists a
q ∈ c −{p} such that for each rule s ∈ R[q], either s ≺ r or body(s) ∩UD,WF 6= ∅.
By definition of immediate consequence in NDL and ID,WF , p ∈ TD,WF .
2. Now suppose p /∈ β(X ↑ λ), and let A be the set of elements not in β(X ↑ λ). Let r
be a rule for p. If r is strict, then r is in the reduct of D relative to X ↑ λ and there
is some q ∈ body(r) such that q ∈ A (this must be the case since β(X ↑ λ) is closed).
If r is defeasible then r is either in the reduct or not. If it is, then as before there
is some q ∈ body(r) such that q ∈ A. If not, then there is a conflict set c ∈ C [p]
such that for all q ∈ c − {p}, there is a rule s ∈ R[q] such that body(s) ⊆ X ↑ λ
and s ⊀ r . From Case 1, if body(s) ⊆ X ↑ λ then body(s) ⊆ TD,WF . Generalizing
on r and then on p, for each a ∈ A and each r ∈ RD,sd [a], either there exists a
q ∈ body(r) such that q ∈ A or else r ∈ Rd [a] and there exists a conflict set c ∈ C [a]
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such that for each v ∈ c − {a} there is a rule s ∈ R[v ] such that body(s) ⊆ TD,WF
and s ⊀ r . It can be seen that A is unfounded under NDL with respect to D and
ID,WF . As such A ⊆ UD (ID,WF ) ⊆ UD,WF . Since p ∈ A, p ∈ UD,WF . 
Proposition 7
Let D be a defeasible theory and (ID ) the sequence of interpretations defined for
D under the NDL-well-founded semantics. For any λ ≥ 0, there exists a η ≥ 0 such
that
1. if p ∈ TD,λ, then p ∈ X ↑ η.
2. if p ∈ UD,λ, then p /∈ β(X ↑ η).
Proof
The hypothesis is trivially satisfied for λ = 0. Suppose it holds for all ordinals less
than λ. We consider each case.
1. Suppose p ∈ Tλ. Then one of two cases applies:
(a) There exists a rule r ∈ Rs [p] such that body(r) ⊆ Tκ for some successor
ordinal κ < λ. If that is the case, then by inductive hypothesis, there exists
an η ≥ 0 such that body(r) ⊆ X ↑ η. Since r is strict and X ↑ η is closed
under strict rules, p ∈ X ↑ η.
(b) there exists a defeasible rule r such that such that body(r) ⊆ Tκ for some κ < λ
and for all c ∈ C [p] there is a q ∈ c − {p} such that for all rules s ∈ R[q],
either s ≺ r or else there exists a v ∈ body(s) such that v ∈ Uκ. If the latter,
then by inductive hypothesis, there exists a η such that v /∈ β(X ↑ η). Since
body(r) ⊆ Tκ, then by inductive hypothesis, body(r) ⊆ X ↑ ι for some ordinal
ι. Note that for any ordinals α and γ, if α < γ, then X ↑ α ⊆ X ↑ γ and
β(X ↑ γ) ⊆ β(X ↑ α), and so for any literal b, if b /∈ β(X ↑ α), then for
all γ > α it follows that b /∈ β(X ↑ γ). With that in mind, generalizing on
s and then c, and letting ι′ be the least ordinal such that η < ι′ and ι < ι′
for any of the above ι’s, we have body(r) ⊆ X ↑ ι′ and for all c ∈ C [p] there
is a q ∈ c − {p} such that for each s ∈ R[q], body(s) * β(X ↑ ι′) or s ≺ r .
As such r ∈ Dβ(X↑ι
′). Since body(r) ⊆ X ↑ ι′, by monotonicity we have
body(r) ⊆ X ↑ ι′ + 1. Recall that X ↑ ι′ + 1 = β(β(X ↑ ι′)) = Cl(Dβ(X↑ι
′)).
We thus have r ∈ Dβ(X↑ι
′) and body(r) ⊆ Cl(Dβ(X↑ι
′)). From this it follows
that p ∈ Cl(Dβ(X↑ι
′)), i.e. p ∈ X ↑ ι′ + 1.
2. Suppose p ∈ Uλ. If λ is a limit ordinal, then there exists some successor ordinal
κ < λ such that p ∈ Uκ. By inductive hypothesis, there exists some η ≥ 0 such
that p /∈ β(X ↑ η). So suppose λ is a successor ordinal. By definition, Uλ is an
unfounded set wrt to D and Iλ−1.
Let a ∈ Uλ and r ∈ Rsd [a]. As such, either (1) there is a v ∈ body(r) such that
v ∈ Uλ ∪ Uλ−1 (which by monotonicity of UD means v ∈ Uλ) or else (2) r ∈ Rd [a]
and there exists a conflict set c ∈ C [a] such that for each q ∈ c − {a}, there is
a rule s ∈ R[q] such that body(s) ⊆ Tλ−1 and s ⊀ r . Suppose (2) holds. Since
body(s) ⊆ Tλ−1, then by inductive hypothesis, there exists a γ ≥ 0 such that
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body(s) ⊆ X ↑ γ. Generalizing on q, there exists a η ≥ 0 such that for each
q ∈ c − {a} there exists a s ∈ R[q] such that body(s) ⊆ X ↑ η and s ⊀ r . As
this is so, by definition of reduct for NDL, r /∈ DX↑η. Thus, if r ∈ DX↑η, then
body(r) ∩ Uλ 6= ∅. Generalizing on r and then a, we may conclude that for each
v ∈ Uλ and each r ∈ Rsd [v ], if r ∈ D
X↑η, then body(r) ∩ Uλ 6= ∅.
Suppose for a proof by contradiction that Uλ ∩ Cl(D
X↑η
β ) 6= ∅. Then there is a
least integer i > 0 such that Uλ ∩ TDX↑η ↑ i 6= ∅. Let v ∈ Uλ ∩ TDX↑η ↑ i .
Since v ∈ TDX↑η ↑ i , it follows that there exists a rule r ∈ Rsd [v ] such that
r ∈ DX↑η and body(r) ⊆ TDX↑η ↑ (i − 1). However, since r ∈ D
X↑η, it must be
that body(r) ∩ Uλ 6= ∅. Thus Uλ ∩ TDX↑η ↑ i − 1 6= ∅. This is a contradiction, and
so Uλ ∩ Cl(D
X↑η
β ) = ∅.
Since p ∈ Uλ and Cl(D
X↑η
β ) = β(X ↑ η + 1), it follows that p /∈ β(X ↑ η + 1)).
From the above propositions, a correspondence between the sequence X ↑ 0,
X ↑ 1, . . ., and the well-founded model according to NDL is established.
Proposition 8
If D is a defeasible theory, ID,WF its well-founded model according to NDL, and λ
the closure ordinal of the sequence XD ↑ 0, XD ↑ 1, . . ., then
ID,WF = 〈XD ↑ λ,Lit(D)− βD (XD ↑ λ)〉·
8 Stable Sets for Defeasible Theories
NDL and ADL, like the well-founded semantics for logic programs, are directly
skeptical formalisms. If a literal p is a consequence of a theory, then there must
be some rule for it with a body that is also a consequence of the theory. This is
in contrast to indirectly skeptical formalisms, such as default logic (Reiter 1980)
and the stable model and answer–set (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) semantics for
logic programs, where consequences are defined indirectly via the intersection of
extensions (stable models, answer–sets). These formalisms allow floating conclu-
sions (Makinson and Schlecta 1991)—i.e. consequences which appear in every ex-
tension but which have no support appearing in every extension. Directly skeptical
formalisms do not allow floating conclusions.
Example 5 (Ginsberg’s extended Nixon Diamond)
D = 〈R,CMIN ∪ {{dove, hawk}},∅〉, where R is
1. ∅→ nixon
2. {nixon} → republican 3. {nixon} → quaker
4. {quaker} ⇒ dove 5. {republican} ⇒ hawk
6. {hawk} → ¬dove 7. {dove} → ¬hawk
8. {hawk} ⇒ extremist 9. {dove} ⇒ extremist
The logic program counterpart to the above theory is
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1. nixon
2. republican ← nixon 3. quaker ← nixon
4. dove ←∼ ¬dove,∼ hawk , quaker 5. hawk ←∼ ¬hawk ,∼ dove, republican
6. ¬dove ← hawk 7. ¬hawk ← dove
8. extremist ←∼ ¬extremist , hawk 9. extremist ←∼ ¬extremist , dove
Here, the positive ADL– and NDL– consequences of the theory agree with the
well-founded model of the logic program: nixon, republican, and quaker are all
well-founded, but no other literal is. In ADL, the literals dove, hawk , and extremist
are all ambiguous. They are unfounded in NDL.
The logic program has two stable models, where S is a stable model of Π if
γΠ(S ) = S .
S1: {nixon, republican, quaker , dove,¬hawk , extremist}
S2: {nixon, republican, quaker ,¬dove, hawk , extremist}
Since extremist appears in each such model, it is taken as a consequence of the
program according to the stable model semantics. Since neither dove nor hawk
appears in both models, extremist is a floating conclusion.
It is indeed possible to use both α and β to define indirectly skeptical semantics
similar to the stable model semantics for logic programs.We do that here. As before,
the semantics based on α only applies to a restricted class of defeasible theories.
Definition 17
Let D = 〈R,C ,≺〉 be a defeasible theory and S ⊆ Lit(D).
1. If ≺= ∅ and Ru = ∅, then S is an α-stable set of D iff S = αD(S ).
2. S is a β-stable set of D iff S = βD (S ).
Definition 18
Let D = 〈R,C ,≺〉 be a defeasible theory and p ∈ Lit(D).
1. If ≺= ∅ and Ru = ∅,
(a) D |≈α p iff p ∈ S for all α-stable sets S .
(b) D ≈|α p iff p /∈ S for all α-stable sets S .
2. For arbitrary theories D ,
(a) D |≈β p iff p ∈ S for all β-stable sets S .
(b) D ≈|β p iff p /∈ S for all β-stable sets S .
In Example 5, D has two α–stable sets, and these correspond to S1 and S2 above.
As such, D |≈α extremist . There is only one β–stable set, however:
{nixon, republican, quaker}.
These three literals must appear in any β–stable set. However, this implies that
rules 4 and 5 can appear in no β–reduct of D , and so extremist can appear in no
β–stable set. It is not a floating conclusion according to the semantics based on β.
As in the case for logic programs, the well-founded models according to ADL and
NDL, respectively, are contained within the stable sets defined using α and β.
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Proposition 9
Let D = 〈R,C ,≺〉 be a defeasible theory.
1. If ≺= ∅, Ru = ∅, and 〈T,U〉 is the well-founded model of D according to
ADL, then for any α-stable set M of D , T ⊆ M , and U ∩ αD(M ) = ∅.
2. If 〈T,U〉 is the well-founded model of D according to NDL, then for any
β-stable set M of D , T ⊆ M , and U ∩ βD (M ) = ∅.
Proof
The proofs are the same for both ADL and NDL, and so we consider only αD .
Define X ↑ 0, X ↑ 1, etc., as above. Clearly, since X ↑ 0 = ∅, X ↑ 0 ⊆ M . Suppose
X ↑ κ ⊆ M for each κ < λ. We may assume wlog that λ is a successor ordinal.
Observe that X ↑ λ = α2D (X ↑ λ− 1). By inductive hypothesis, X ↑ λ− 1 ⊆ M .
Since α2D is monotone, α
2
D(X ↑ λ− 1) ⊆ α
2
D (M ). Since X ↑ λ = α
2
D (X ↑ λ− 1)
and M is a stable set, it follows that X ↑ λ ⊆ M . Generalizing, T ⊆ M . Since
αD is antimonotone, it follows that αD (M ) ⊆ αD (T), and so Lit(D) − αD (T) ⊆
Lit(D)− αD (M ). I.e., U ⊆ Lit(D)−M . And so U ∩M = ∅.
No stable set of a defeasible theory is a subset of another. This parallels the case
for the stable models/answer-sets of logic programs (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991)
and is the result of α and β being antimonotone. For instance, if S1 and S2 are
α–stable sets such that S1 ⊆ S2, then αD(S2) ⊆ αD(S1), and so S2 ⊆ S1.
Proposition 10
If S1 and S2 are distinct α (β) stable sets of defeasible theory D , then S1 6⊆ S2.
Given the close connection between α and γ, for each defeasible theory D with
no defeaters and priorities, then provided that C [p] is finite for each p ∈ Lit(D),
we may conclude that the α-stable sets of D correspond to the stable models of
its logic program translation. Furthermore, as shown below (Propositions 11–13), a
correspondence for the translation in the reverse direction also holds. That is, if Π
is a normal logic program, then the stable models of Π correspond to the α-stable
sets of DΠ.
Observe that this implies that any stable model of Φ is a classical interpretation
(and so can be represented as a set of atoms). Below, if X ⊆ At(Π), let
X¬ = X ∪ {¬p|p ∈ At(Π) and p /∈ X }.
Proposition 11
Let Π be a normal logic program and Φ the explicit version of Π. For any M ⊆
At(Π), TΠM ↑ ω = (TΦM¬ ↑ ω ∩ At(Π)).
Proof
We show that for all i ≥ 0 and p ∈ At(Π), p ∈ TΠM ↑ i implies p ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ ω,
and p ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ i implies p ∈ TΠM ↑ ω. The case for i = 0 is vacuous. Suppose the
claim holds for all i < n.
If p ∈ TΠM ↑ n, then there is a rule r ∈ Π such that body(r)
+ ⊆ TΠM ↑ (n − 1)
and q /∈ M for each q ∈ body(r)−. Let r ′ ∈ Φ be strict rule corresponding to r . By
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inductive hypothesis, body(r)+ ⊆ TΦM¬ ↑ ω. For each q, ¬q ← ∅ ∈ Φ
M¬ and so
¬q ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ ω. It follows that body(r
′) ⊆ TΦM¬ ↑ ω, and so p ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ ω.
If p ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ n, then there is a rule r ∈ Φ
M¬ such that body(r) ⊆ TΦM¬ ↑
(n − 1). By inductive hypothesis, a ∈ TΠM ↑ ω for each atom a ∈ body(r). For
each ¬q ∈ body(r), it must be that ¬q ← ∅ ∈ ΦM
¬
, and so q /∈ M ¬ and q /∈ M .
Rule r corresponds to a rule r ′ ∈ Π such that atom a ∈ body(r) iff a ∈ body(r ′)+,
and ¬q ∈ body(r) iff q ∈ body(r ′)−. Given that no q ∈ body(r ′)− appears in M ,
p ← body(r ′)+ ∈ ΠM . Since body(r ′)+ ⊆ TΠM ↑ ω, it follows that p ∈ TΠM ↑ ω.
Proposition 12
Let Π be a normal logic program and Φ its explicit version. M ⊆ At(Π) is a stable
model of Π iff M ¬ is a stable model of Φ.
Proof
M ¬ ∩ At(Π) = M , and from Prop. 11, TΠM ↑ ω = (TΦM¬ ↑ ω ∩ At(Π)). If M
is a stable model of Π, M = (TΦM¬ ↑ ω ∩ At(Π)), and so for each p ∈ At(Π),
p ∈ M ¬ iff p ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ ω. If ¬p ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ ω, then ¬p ← ∅ ∈ Φ
M¬ and
so p /∈ M ¬. If that is so, then p /∈ M and (by definition of M ¬) ¬p ∈ M ¬.
Conversely, if ¬p ∈ M ¬, then p /∈ M , and so ¬p ← ∅ ∈ ΦM
¬
. Consequently,
¬p ∈ TΦM¬ ↑ ω. As such, M
¬ is a stable model of Φ. If, in turn, M ¬ is a stable
model of Φ, TΠM ↑ ω = (M
¬ ∩At(Π)) = M , and so M is a stable model of Π.
Proposition 13
Let Π be a normal logic program and DΠ its defeasible logic translation. M is a
stable model of Π iff M ¬ is an α-stable set of DΠ.
Proof
Translating DΠ into a logic program using the Brewka-inspired scheme yields Φ. As
implied by Proposition 5, the α-stable sets of DΠ correspond to the stable models of
Φ. However, by Prop. 12, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the stable models
of Φ and those of Π.
Example 6
The defeasible theory from Example 2 and its logic program translation are shown
again below.
1. ∅⇒ p
2. ∅⇒ ¬p
3. {p} ⇒ ¬q
4. ∅⇒ q
1. p ←∼ ¬p
2. ¬p ←∼ p
3. ¬q ←∼ q, p
4. q ←∼ ¬q
The α-stable sets of the defeasible theory are {p, q}, {p,¬q}, and {¬p, q}. These
are also the stable models of the counterpart logic program. The only β-stable set
is {q}, however. Neither p nor ¬p can appear in any stable set (the rules for them
would be deleted in any β-reduct), and this implies that ¬q cannot appear, either.
As reported earlier (Maier 2010), ADL is more conservative than NDL, in the
sense that for all D and p, if D |≈ADL p, then D |≈NDL p. From this, it readily
follows that D |≈ADL p implies D |≈β p. However, the similar claim does not hold
if |≈α is used in place of |≈ADL. That is, D |≈α p does not imply D |≈β p.
26 Frederick Maier
Example 7
D = 〈R,CMIN ,∅〉, where R is
1. ∅⇒ p
2. ∅⇒ ¬p
3. {p} ⇒ q
4. {¬p} ⇒ q
Here, the α-stable sets are {p, q} and {¬p, q}, and so D |≈α q. However, the only
β-stable set is ∅, which implies D ≈|β q.
ADL is also more conservative than NDL in the sense that D ≈|ADL p implies
D ≈|NDL p. We don’t know yet whether D ≈|α p implies D ≈|β p.
9 Related Work
As stated above, NDL (Nute 1999; Nute 2003; Donnelly 1999) and its ambiguity
propagating counterpart ADL (Maier and Nute 2006) were the first defeasible log-
ics to incorporate failure-by-looping, and this cycle check essentially requires the
proof-systems to be tree-based—different branches of computation must be kept dis-
tinct. In BDL (Billington 1993) and most other variants of defeasible logic, proofs
are linear sequences of tagged literals. In these logics, cycles cannot be detected,
and this affects the conclusions they can draw. Maher and Governatori (1999),
however, do provide a well-founded semantics for BDL which correctly handles cy-
cles. Presumably, the BDL proof system is sound but not complete relative to this
semantics.
The logics based on BDL also differ from NDL and ADL in that they make a
distinction between strict and defeasible derivations. E.g., the expression +∆p in
a derivation indicates that p is derivable using only the strict rules of a theory,
while +δp means that p is derivable using the theory as a whole (the corresponding
negative expressions −∆p and −δp indicate that p is refutable). Significantly, if
the body of a strict rule r is only defeasibly derivable, then the rule is treated as a
defeasible rule, i.e. a rule which can be defeated. This prevents BDL from inferring
contradictions except for those due to strict rules alone.
Example 8
D = 〈R,CMIN ,∅〉, R is
1. ∅⇒ married 2. {married} → ¬bachelor 3. ∅⇒ bachelor
In BDL and its variants, married and bachelor do not conflict, and so married
is defeasibly derivable (there is a proof ending in +δmarried). However, since the
body of rule 2 is only defeasibly derivable, rule 2 is considered defeasible. Since BDL
blocks ambiguity, in that logic both bachelor and ¬bachelor are defeasibly refuted
(in the ambiguity propagating logic described by Antoniou et al. (2000b), both
literals are ambiguous). In contrast, if conflict sets are closed under strict rules, then
NDL and ADL hold that married and bachelor conflict and refrain from deriving
either (they are refuted in NDL and ambiguous in ADL). Antoniou (2006) calls the
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approach taken in ADL and NDL the “purist view”, and he defends the alternative.
Brewka (2001) rejects the dual treatment of strict rules, however: Strict rules are
used to specify definitions, necessary relationships, etc. To treat them sometimes
defeasibly undermines this. Essentially the same argument was made when the
semantics for ADL and NDL was first developed (Maier 2010). Extended conflict
sets were introduced in NDL and ADL to avoid drawing inconsistent conclusions
based on defeasible rules while at the same time maintaining the monolithic nature
of strict rules.
The first ambiguity propagating defeasible logics appeared around the year 2000
(Antoniou et al. 2000a). Up to that point, all defeasible logics were ambiguity block-
ing. In (Antoniou et al. 2000a), the basic propagating logic—based on BDL—is pre-
sented as a system embedded in a logic program. A formal proof system appeared
separately (Antoniou et al. 2000b; Antoniou and Billington 2001).
BDL itself extends an earlier logic (Nute et al. 1989; Billington et al. 1990). Specif-
ically, BDL adds variables and function symbols to the logic, and (importantly) it
allows the precedence relation to range over both strict and defeasible rules. In the
earlier logic (as in NDL and ADL), strict rules are superior to all defeasible rules
and no strict rule is superior to any other strict rule. In his analysis, Brewka (2001)
shows that when the precedence relation is restricted to defeasible rules, the defea-
sible logic is sound but not complete wrt his prioritized well-founded semantics.
In a separate line of work, David Billington has developed a family of for-
malisms that are generally called plausible logic (Billington 2004; 2005a; 2005b;
2008; Billington and Rock 2001). Plausible logic is based on defeasible logic, using
both strict and defeasible rules, but it expands it to handle arbitrary clauses. Unlike
in defeasible logic, disjunctions can be proved. Extended conflict sets are not used,
but the logics have what is called the general conflict property (Billington 2008),
meaning that defeasible rules conflict if they cannot all fire without contradicting
the strict part of the theory. Proofs are again sequences of tagged formulas, and
these tags are used to define multiple consequence relations (which correspond to
different levels of certainty). Through the use of tags, the proof system simulta-
neously allows both the blocking and propagation of ambiguity. Loop detection is
discussed in (Billington 2004; 2008). Given the number of NMR formalisms in exis-
tence today and the differing intuitions they embody, a formalism such as plausible
logic—which attempts to unify these intuitions into a single system—appears very
attractive.
In (Billington 2007), multiple semantics for plausible theories are provided, cor-
responding to differing intuitions about acceptable consequences. Plausible theories
are related to default theories (Reiter 1980), and it is shown how the framework
can provide an ambiguity blocking semantics for default logic. Given the known
relationships between default logic and the stable model semantics for logic pro-
grams (Marek and Truszczynski 1989), the work in (Billington 2007) can be seen
as applying to logic programs.
Other variants of defeasible logic have been related to different NMR formalisms.
A Dung-like argumentation semantics for BDL and its variants is provided in
(Governatori et al. 2000) and (Governatori et al. 2004). The relationship between
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defeasible logic (again, an ambiguity propagating variant of BDL) and default logic
is addressed in (Antoniou and Billington 2001). A means of translating defeasible
theories into default theories is given, and it is shown that every defeasible conse-
quence appears in every extension of the corresponding default theory. The paper
does not address refutations—i.e., it is not proven whether a literal defeasibly re-
futed is absent from every default extension.
The logic-programming embedding used by Antoniou et al. first appeared in
(Maher and Governatori 1999). It is shown there that the BDL-consequences of a
defeasible theory correspond to those of the counterpart program under the Kunen
semantics (Kunen 1987). The same paper presents the well-founded semantics for
BDL mentioned above and shows that the consequences under this semantics cor-
respond to the well-founded model of the program. In (Antoniou et al. 2006), it is
shown that under the translation, the conclusions of the defeasible theory corre-
spond to the intersection of stable models of the program. This result holds only
for what the authors call decisive theories—theories in which every literal is either
provable or refutable (or, equivalently, theories whose dependency graph is acyclic).
Without decisiveness, the correspondence holds only in one direction: every literal
provable in the defeasible logic appears in the intersection of stable models.
We note that the translation used by Antoniou et al. is not at all like the Brewka-
inspired scheme described above, and in our opinion it does not by itself expose a
close relationship between defeasible logic and logic programming. In their method
of translation, the defeasible logic proof system is explicitly encoded in the logic
program. E.g., the proof-conditions governing strict derivations are represented (in
Prolog notation) as
definitely(X):-
fact(X).
definitely(X):-
strict(RuleID,X, [Y1, ... , Yl]),
definitely(Y1), ... , definitely(Yn).
A statement X is definitely (strictly) derivable (+∆X ) if X is a fact of the theory,
or if there is a strict rule with head X and every literal of the body is also definitely
derivable. The rules of a defeasible theory are represented as facts in the logic
program. E.g.,
strict(rule1, bird(a), [swan(a)]).
defeasible(rule2, white(a), [swan(a)]).
In this fashion, the logic program encodes both the defeasible theory (as terms
appearing in facts and rules) and the proof system itself. In the Brewka-inspired
scheme, it is only the defeasible theory that is translated and not the entirety of
the proof system. Because of this, we consider the relationships between ADL and
the WFS, proven above, to be more insightful.
The fixpoint semantics for NDL and ADL appear in (Maier 2010), and it is
shown there that the proof systems for NDL and ADL are sound with respect to
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their counterpart semantics, and that they are complete for locally finite theories.
It is also shown there that, when the priorities on rules are transitive, ADL and
NDL satisfy versions of Cut and Cautious Monotony (that is, they are cumulative).
It is widely accepted that a good nonmonotonic formalism should satisfy these.
Defeasible theories such as the one shown in Example 3 are problematic for both
ADL and NDL. In that example, q is not well-founded in either NDL or ADL,
but it intuitively should be (in the corresponding logic program, q is indeed well-
founded). Examples such as this show that, while extended conflict sets are needed
in some cases to draw reasonable conclusions, their use can cause problems in other
cases. An alternative to using extended conflict sets is to keep conflict sets minimal
while adding all possible transpositions of strict rules to the defeasible theory. If
this is done, then the intuitively correct result can be drawn in Example 3. Doing
this (or else closing conflict sets under strict rules), allows NDL and ADL to satisfy
Consistency Preservation. That is, the logics cannot be used to derive contradictions
that do not follow from the strict rules alone. This is shown in (Maier 2010).
10 Conclusion
Nute’s logic NDL was developed in isolation of the well-founded semantics, but
the desire to handle theories containing cycles appears to be the same. While it
is unsurprising that the consequences under NDL do not correspond to those of
the WFS—NDL blocks ambiguity while the WFS propagates it—we have shown
here that under natural translations of defeasible theories into logic programs (and
vice versa), the consequences according to ADL and the WFS actually do coincide.
This, in a sense, is surprising, as ADL was developed by making only a minor
modification to the proof system of NDL.
The present research was initiated with an eye toward practicality. The ability to
translate defeasible theories into logic programs means that existing logic program-
ming systems can be used to reason according to ADL. In the other direction, NDL
indirectly provides an ambiguity blocking semantics for logic programs, and ADL
provides a representation of logic programs under the WFS that in some cases is
intuitively easier to comprehend (this is an arguable point; nevertheless, we suppose
that some at least will find ⇒ more readily understood than default negation).
The antimonotone operator defined for ADL only works properly when defeaters
are not present in the defeasible theory and when the priority relation over rules
is empty. Both defeaters and priorities can in fact be compiled way, however. That
is, a defeasible theory D of ADL or NDL can be transformed into an equivalent
one E such that Ru = ∅, ≺= ∅, and C is minimal. This is shown in Appendix B.
A similar transformation is discussed in the context of other defeasible logics in
(Antoniou et al. 2001). Nevertheless, while the elimination of priorities and de-
featers allows the use of α to compute all of the ADL consequences of a theory, it
is not a very satisfying solution, as it requires expressing important elements of the
logic (e.g., conflicts, priorities) directly in the rules of the theory. In that sense, the
transformation is similar to the embedding noted above of BDL into logic programs.
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An operator which does not require any sort of transformation in order to do its
work would be far better.
Similar work on adding priorities to the WFS has been performed, notably by
Brewka (1996), and also by Torsten Schaub and Kewen Wang (2002). Both have
developed prioritized well-founded semantics for extended logic programs, and in
both cases, the models can be computed in polynomial time relative to the size of the
program. At this point, we don’t know how ADL relates to these formalisms, and we
haven’t investigated whether their way of handling preferences can be easily adopted
for use with ADL (or other defeasible logics). It is certainly the case, however, that
the two logic programming formalisms yield results different than ADL, for the
simple reason that both formalisms are explosive. E.g., in both formalisms, the
well-founded model of the program
1. p
2. ¬p
3. q ← r , s , t
is the set of all literals. In contrast, q would be considered unfounded according
to ADL. In our view, this is the correct conclusion, as we really have no reason to
believe q. Other varieties of defeasible logic would similarly consider q unfounded;
none would conclude q. By their nature, defeasible logics are paraconsistent.
Appendix A NDL and ADL proof systems
Proofs in NDL and ADL form argument trees, with nodes labeled with tagged
literals (for a given node n, label(n) refers to the label of n). In earlier defeasible
logics, such as BDL, proofs are linear sequences of tagged literals.
Definition 19
Let D be a defeasible theory. A defeasible argument tree for D is a finite tree τ
such that every node of τ is labeled with one of +p or −p, where p is any literal
in Lit(D). If τ is a defeasible argument tree for D and n is a node in τ , then τ is a
positive node iff n is labeled +p, and n is a negative node iff n is labeled −p.
Definition 20
Let A be a set of literals, and n a node of a defeasible argument tree τ .
1. A succeeds at n iff for all q ∈ A, there is a child of n labeled +q.
2. A fails at n iff there is a q ∈ A and a child of n labeled −q.
A tree over D with root +p indicates that p is defeasibly derivable from D ; a
tree over D with root −p indicates that p is defeasibly refuted. In order to count as
a valid proof in NDL or ADL, the nodes of the tree must satisfy certain conditions.
We discuss the conditions for NDL first.
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Definition 21
An argument tree τ over defeasible theory D is an NDL-proof for D iff for each
node n of τ , one of the following obtains.
1. label(n) = +p and either
a. there is an r ∈ Rs [p] such that body(r) succeeds at n, or
b. there is an r ∈ Rd [p] such that
i. body(r) succeeds at n, and
ii. for all c ∈ C [p] there is a q ∈ c − {p} such that for all s ∈ R[q],
either body(s) fails at n or else s ≺ r .
2. label(n) = −p and
a. for all r ∈ Rs [p], body(r) fails at n, and
b. for all r ∈ Rd [p], either
i. body(r) fails at n, or
ii. there is a c ∈ C [p] such that for all q ∈ c − {p}, there is a s ∈ R[q]
such that body(s) succeeds at n and s ⊀ r .
3. label(n) = −p and n has an ancestor m in τ with label(m) = −p, and all
nodes between n and m are negative.
Definition 22
Let D be a defeasible theory and τ an NDL-proof for D .
1. τ is an NDL-proof of p in D iff τ is an NDL-proof for D , p ∈ Lit(D), and
the root node of τ is labeled +p. If such a proof exists, then D |∼NDL p.
2. τ is an NDL-refutation of p in D iff τ is an NDL-proof for D , p ∈ Lit(D), and
the root node of τ is labeled −p. If such a refutation exists, then D ∼|NDL p.
The third condition in Definition 21 is called failure-by-looping, and it prevents
a literal from being derived using a circular argument. According to the condition,
the nodes between n and m must all be negative. This ensures that literals are not
simultaneously provable and refutable. It is failure–by–looping that requires the
proofs to be trees rather than linear sequences of literals.
NDL is an ambiguity blocking logic. Returning to Example 2, the conclusions
are D ∼|NDL p, D ∼|NDL ¬p, D ∼|NDL ¬q, and D |∼NDL q. NDL can be modified,
however, in a simple way to make it propagate ambiguity—yielding ADL. In ADL,
a defeasible rule r can only be defeated by a conflicting set of rules that are strict
or else of higher priority (in NDL, rules simply not inferior to r can be used). The
modification to the proof system is shown in Definition 23. Proofs and refutations
in ADL are otherwise defined as they are in NDL.
Definition 23
An argument tree τ for D is an ADL-proof for D iff each node n of τ satisfies
conditions 1, 2.a, 2.b.i, or 3 of Definition 21, or else the modified condition 2.b.ii
below:
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2.b.ii. there is a c ∈ C [p] such that for all q ∈ c − {p}, there is a s ∈ R[q]
such that body(s) succeeds at n and s is strict or else r ≺ s .
Proofs in ADL and NDL are finite trees, and so must work with finite sets of
literals. The fixpoint semantics for NDL and ADL can work with infinite sets,
however, and because of this the proof systems cannot be complete with respect to
their counterpart semantics. Nevertheless, the proof systems are sound with respect
to the semantics, and for locally finite theories they are also complete.
Definition 24
Let D be a defeasible theory and p ∈ Lit(D).
1. DepD (p) is the smallest set such that (i) p ∈ DepD (p); (ii) for each q ∈
DepD (p), if c ∈ C [q], then c ⊆ DepD (p); and (iii) for each q ∈ DepD (p), if
r ∈ R[q], then body(r) ⊆ DepD (p).
2. Literal p is locally finite in D iff DepD (p) is finite.
3. D is locally finite iff each literal of Lit(D) is locally finite in D .
Proposition 14
(Maier 2010) If D is a defeasible theory, p ∈ Lit(D), and L one of NDL or ADL,
1. D |∼L p implies D |≈L p, and D ∼|L p, implies D ≈|L p.
2. If p is locally finite in D , D |≈L p implies D |∼L p and D ≈|L p implies
D ∼|L p.
Appendix B Eliminating Priorities and Defeaters
If D = 〈RD ,CD ,≺D〉 is a defeasible theory such that CD [p] is finite for all p ∈
Lit(D), then D can be translated into an equivalent theory E = 〈RE ,CE ,≺E 〉,
called the defeater– and priority–free form of D , in which RE ,u = ∅, ≺E= ∅, and
CE is minimal. Specifically, E is the smallest theory such that the following hold
(in the following, A 99K p stands for an arbitrary rule):
1. If rule r : A 99K p is in RD , the rules
r ′: A→ su(r)
r ′′: {su(r)} 99K fi(r)
appear in RE , with r
′′ strict (defeasible) if r is strict (defeasible or a defeater).
2. If r : A 99K p is strict or defeasible, the following also occurs in RE :
r ′′′: {fi(r)} → p.
3. Let c = {q1, . . . , qn , p} ∈ CD [p] be a conflict set, r ∈ RD,d [p] and s1, . . . , sn
rules such that si ∈ RD [qi ] and si ⊀D r . The following rule appears in RE :
{su(s1), . . . , su(sn)} 99K ¬fi(r).
It is strict if si ∈ Rs or r ≺D si for all si , and defeasible otherwise.
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The rules of E explicitly encode when a rule r of D is supported and when it
may fire. In item 3, only rules si that could defeat r are used. For any conflict set
c ∈ CD [head(r)], let trans(c, r) denote the set of rules for ¬fi(r) created from c.
Importantly, the conflict sets of E are minimal. If D itself uses minimal conflict sets,
then if r ∈ RD,sd [p] and s ∈ R[¬p], condition 3 above reduces to {su(s)} → ¬fi(r)
if s is strict or r ≺D s , and to {su(s)} ⇒ ¬fi(r) if s ⊀D r .
Proposition 15
Let D be a defeasible theory such that for all p ∈ Lit(D), CD [p] is finite, and let
E be the defeater– and priority–free form of D . If p ∈ TD,WF (p ∈ UD,WF ), then
p ∈ TE ,WF (p ∈ UE ,WF ).
Proof
The proof proceeds by induction on the sequence ID,0, ID,1, . . ., and shows that
for all κ ≥ 0, if p ∈ TD,κ then p ∈ TE ,WF , and if p ∈ UD,κ then p ∈ UE ,WF . The
claim holds trivially for κ = 0. Suppose that it holds for all κ < λ. We can assume
without loss of generality that λ is a successor ordinal.
1. Suppose p ∈ TD,λ. Then there is an r ∈ RD [p] such that body(r) ⊆ TD,λ−1 and
either (1) r ∈ RD,s or else (2) r ∈ RD,d and for each c ∈ CD [p], there is a
q ∈ c − {p} and for all s ∈ RD [q], body(s) ∩ UD,λ−1 6= ∅ or s ≺D r . By the
inductive hypothesis, body(r) ⊆ TE ,WF , and so su(r) ∈ TE ,WF . If (1) holds, r
′′ is
strict, and so p ∈ TE ,WF .
So suppose (2) obtains. Then r ′′ is defeasible. By the inductive hypothesis, for
every c ∈ CD [p], there is a q ∈ c − {p} such that for every rule s ∈ RD [q],
either (i) body(s) ∩ UE ,WF 6= ∅, or else (ii) s ≺D r . In other words, if s ⊀D r
then body(s) ∩ UE ,WF 6= ∅ and so su(s) ∈ UE ,WF . As such, for every rule t ∈
trans(c, r), body(t) ∩ UE ,WF 6= ∅. Generalizing on c, for every rule t ∈ RE [¬fi(r)],
body(t) ∩ UE ,WF 6= ∅. By definition of TE and IE ,WF , both fi(r) ∈ TE ,WF and
p ∈ TE ,WF .
2. Now suppose that p ∈ UD,λ. Let X = UD,λ ∪ {fi(r)| r ∈ RD [p] and p ∈ UD,λ} ∪
{su(r), fi(r)| body(r) ∩ UD,λ 6= ∅}. We will show that X is unfounded wrt E and
IE ,WF . Note that there are three types of literal in X : Those in UD,λ, and those
of the form fi(r) or su(r). Regarding the first two types, if p ∈ UD,λ, then (by
definition of X ) fi(r) ∈ X for all rules {fi(r)} → p ∈ RE [p]. This exhausts all rules
in E for p. If su(r) ∈ X , then by definition of X , body(r) ∩ UD,λ 6= ∅.
Regarding the third type, suppose fi(r) ∈ X . Recall r ∈ RD [p] for some p, and
r ′ is the only rule in E for fi(r). If body(r) ∩ UD,λ 6= ∅, then su(r) ∈ X . If
body(r) ∩ UD,λ = ∅, then (by definition of X ) p ∈ UD,λ. Since p ∈ UD,λ and
body(r) ∩ UD,λ = ∅, r (and r ′) must be defeasible, and there must be a c ∈ CD [p]
such that for all qi ∈ c−{p}, there is a rule si ∈ RD [qi ] such that body(si ) ∈ TD,λ−1
and r ≺D si or si is strict (for NDL, si ⊀D r). This implies that the rule t :
{su(s1), su(s2), . . . , su(sλ)} → ¬fi(r) appears in E (for NDL t is defeasible). By
the inductive hypothesis, for each si , body(si ) ∈ TE ,WF , and so su(si) ∈ TE ,WF .
X is thus unfounded wrt E and IE ,WF (i.e., X ⊆ UE ,WF ), and so p ∈ UE ,WF . 
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Proposition 16
Let D be a defeasible theory such that for all p ∈ Lit(D), CD [p] is finite, and let
E be the defeater– and priority–free form of D . If p ∈ TE ,WF (p ∈ UE ,WF ), then
p ∈ TD,WF (p ∈ UD,WF ).
Proof
The proof proceeds by induction on the sequence IE ,0, IE ,1, . . ., and shows that
for all κ ≥ 0, if p ∈ TE ,κ then p ∈ TD,WF , and if p ∈ UE ,κ then p ∈ UD,WF . The
claim holds trivially for κ = 0. Suppose that it holds for all κ < λ. We can again
assume without loss of generality that λ is a successor ordinal.
1. Suppose p ∈ TE ,λ. Then there is an r ∈ RD [p], matching rules r
′, r ′′, r ′′′ ∈ RE , and
a least η < λ such that {fi(r), su(r)}∪body(r) ⊆ TE ,η. By the inductive hypothesis,
body(r) ⊆ TD,WF . If r ∈ RD,s [p], then clearly p ∈ TD,WF .
So suppose r ∈ Rd [p]. For every t ∈ RE [¬fi(r)], there is an su(s) ∈ body(t)
such that su(s) ∈ UE ,η. This implies that body(s) ∩ UE ,η 6= ∅. By the inductive
hypothesis, body(s) ∩ UD,WF 6= ∅. Given this (and the definition of trans(c, r)),
for any c ∈ CD [p], there must be a q ∈ c − {p} such that for each s ∈ RD [q],
body(s) ∩ UD,WF 6= ∅ or else s ≺D r . By definition of TD and ID,WF , p ∈ TD,WF .
2. Now suppose p ∈ UE ,λ and let a be any literal in Lit(D)∩UE ,λ. Then for each rule
r ′′′: {fi(r)} → a, fi(r) ∈ UE ,λ and for each rule r
′′: {su(r)} 99K fi(r), either (1)
su(r) ∈ UE ,λ, or (2) r
′′ is defeasible and there is a t : su(s1), . . . , su(sn) 99K ¬fi(r)
such that body(t) ⊆ TE ,λ−1 and t is strict (for NDL, t ⊀E r ′′). If (1) it follows that
body(r) ⊆ UE ,λ. If (2) then for each su(si) ∈ body(t), body(si ) ⊆ TE ,γ for some
γ < λ and by the inductive hypothesis body(si ) ⊆ TD,WF . Given the construction
of rules such as t , there exists a c ∈ CD [a] such that for all q ∈ c − {a} there is a
s ∈ RD [q] such that body(s) ⊆ TD,WF and r ≺D s or s strict (for NDL, s ⊀D r).
Generalizing on a, UE ,λ is unfounded wrt D and TD,WF , and so p ∈ UD,WF . 
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